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New Institutional Developments in GATT
Victoria Curzon Price*
It is well known that GATT is not an international organiza-
tion, but a treaty. After the United States failed to ratify the
Havana Charter, the International Trade Organization (ITO),
which was to have been the third pillar of the post-war interna-
tional economic system alongside the IMF and World Bank,
failed to materialize.' The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (1947) was all that remained.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES (that is, the parties to
GATT acting collectively) comprised the only administrative or-
gan mentioned in the treaty. As a result, the institutional struc-
ture of GATT today is the product of organic development over
almost half a century of existence - a unique phenomenon
among the major instruments of world order.
The GATT Council well illustrates the peculiar nature of
this organic development. The Council was set up in 1960 to con-
duct "intersessional" business - i.e., the day-to-day running of
the multilateral trade system when the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES are not sitting in their full-scale annual session. The
Council is a self-selected body composed of the "representatives
of all contracting parties willing to accept the responsibilities of
membership. ' 2 It makes decisions (sometimes only provision-
ally, awaiting the next annual session) on any matter that arises.
The only area where it is specifically not permitted to act on its
own authority is in the granting of waivers, although it can agree
to organize a postal ballot of all contracting parties between full
* Victoria Curzon Price is a Professor of Economics at the University of
Geneva; she holds a Licence 6s sciences politiques and a Docturat 6s sciences
politiques, mention relations internationales, (section economie politique) from
the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva.
1. See generally RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY:
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABERATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE (1956). Gardner describes in detail the fate of the proposed Charter of
the International Trade Organization (known as the Havana Charter).
2. Rules of Procedures for Sessions of the Contracting Parties-Other Pro-
cedures, BISD 9th Supp. 7, 7 (1961).
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sessions.3
The Council in fact runs GATT. The annual plenary ses-
sions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in the view of one au-
thority, have been turned "into appellate bodies for issues that
are too delicate or too important to be definitively resolved by
operating-level civil servants."4 The Council is by definition
composed of a group of countries interested in GATT, number-
ing about half the total membership. Each of these countries
believes that it has a stake in the system. Thus, the Council is a
flexible and effective way of bridging the gaps between univer-
sality of purpose (over 100 members now), reasonable efficiency
of operation, and legitimacy of the outcome.
Numerous specialized committees and working parties hav-
ing a more limited membership assist the Council. The member-
ship of these smaller groups fluctuates according to the work at
hand and has expanded considerably since the end of the Tokyo
Round because of the 1979 MTN agreements. 5 In short, the
GATT has informally developed the institutions that it needs to
run the multilateral trading system. While the institutional
structures are flexible (very much d gdomdtrie variable), the un-
derlying legal instrument is not. Indeed, one of the reasons for
the proliferation of "side agreements" is that Part I of GATT,
(the unconditional Most-Favoured-Nation clause) can only be
amended by unanimous agreement and subsequent ratification
by all members. Amendment of other parts of the General
Agreement requires a two-thirds majority vote.6
Is this contrast between the rigidity of the underlying treaty
and the flexibility of the institutions that have been set up to
administer it a strength or a weakness? Those who consider that
international relations in general and international trade rela-
tions in particular are governed, in the ultimate analysis, by
power, would take the view that the organic process of institu-
tional development is a strength. The resulting structures rep-
resent what sovereign states are prepared to tolerate in terms of
3. Id at 8. See also JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 154-57 (1969) [hereinafter, JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT].
4. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 339 (1970).
5. As a result of the Tokyo Round "side agreements," nine permanent
committees were established in the following areas: anti-dumping practices,
customs valuation, government procurement, import licensing, subsidies and
countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, trade in civil aircraft, dairy
products and meat.
6. The requirements for amending GATT are in GATT Article XXX.
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procedures and disciplines and, while less than perfect, the sov-
ereign states will likely respect them.7 Those who consider that
a "major purpose of human institutions is to prevent the disaster
that occurs precisely when the 'political will' to act construc-
tively is absent" believe that GATT's many shortcomings "are
related to the constitutional defects of GATT, although they are
by no means solely caused by them."9 According to this view,
things would have been better if GATT had contained formal
institutions and procedures.
We economists are happy to leave this debate to the lawyers,
diplomats and political scientists. The only light that economics
can shed on this question is to note that even mercantiistic sov-
ereign states can see virtue in swapping trade concessions in a
framework of law - otherwise GATT would not exist at all.
But the problem is that of any public good: each party to the
agreement derives benefit from the general stability and predict-
ability which are the goals of the treaty, and each is in principle
willing to place limits on its own behavior in exchange for gener-
ating, collectively, the public good. At the same time, however,
each member, individually, has an incentive to cheat.
This is the classic free-rider problem which Paul Streeten,
in a letter to The Economist, put this way:
The ranking of preferences by each country is as follows:
1) My country does not contribute while others do. (Free riding: de-
fection of one.)
2) My country contributes together with others. (Co-operation.)
3) No country contributes. (Defection of all: disappearance of the
horse.)
4) My country contributes while no other country does. (Sucker.) 10
In the absence of strong incentives for compliance, the outcome
is likely to be outcome number 3. Or, as Jan Tumlir, former
director of the GATT Secretariat's Economic Research and
7. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GAT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM (1985), cited in JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT
SYSTEM 59-60 (1990) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING THE GATT]. As Long, dis-
cussing the GATT dispute-settlement system (which is where violations tend to
surface) puts it: "[A]s part of... the recognition by all contracting parties that
legalism does not contribute to trade liberalization, emphasis has shifted from
the formal role of the GATT as third-party arbiter to its informal role as cata-
lyst for the resolution of disputes by the disputing parties themselves" (empha-
sis added). The phrase in italics is a very strong statement and implies that its
author considers that pragmatism is the right road to follow in GATT matters.
8. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 54.
9. Id. at 17.
10. Paul Streeten, Cool Riders, Letters to the Editor, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2,
1991, at 10.
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Analysis Unit, put it: "Without the judge and bailiff in the back-
ground, contracts do not mean much. At the international level,
we have seen .... the "judge and bailiff" is, simply, power and
the willingness to use it.""' The story of GATT's institutional
development is one of attempting, against all odds, to install in-
centives for compliance.
This Article will review two recent developments in this
connection emerging from the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations: (1) The improvements in GATT's dispute
settlement procedures and the establishment of a Trade Policy
Review Mechanism; and (2) the establishment of a possible Mul-
tilateral Trade Organization and improved transparency at the
national level. For, like it or not, the multilateral trading sys-
tem continues to evolve organically by trial and error. As it
evolves, the system tries to attain the elusive goals of stability
and freer trade, and respect for treaty obligations.
I. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS IN GATT'S DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
One of GATT's major problems is that "many existing rules
are violated .... the [dispute resolution] system is often circum-
vented, and ... governments and traders feel no serious obliga-
tion to abide by the rules."'12 Arguably, violations of rules by one
member state would be detected by others and generate a dis-
pute which, in the ultimate analysis, would lead to supervised
retaliation as provided for in GATT's dispute settlement system.
The "judge" would be the CONTRACTING PARTIES (or, since
1960, the Council) adopting a panel report on the dispute and the
"bailiff" would be the cost of offering compensation or resorting
to retaliation. This much the GATT provides for in Article
XXIII.
Robert Hudec, however, noted as early as 1978 that
[a]lthough the GATT panel procedure was surprisingly effective in the
years before 1960, there is a problem with the current operation of that
procedure, evidenced both by a sharp decline in the utilisation of the
panel procedure by most governments and by increased levels of resist-
ance and unpleasantness found in recent proceedings that have been
11. Jan Tumlir, GAYT Rules and Community Law, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND GATT 1, 20 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
12. Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, Objectives of the Uruguay
Round, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE




Hudec found that there had been a noticeable decline in the use
of the panel procedure, from an average of five per year from
1948-1959 to only two per year from 1960-1976, which he attrib-
uted to various causes. One of these causes was a desire to de-
flect complaints "into less threatening 'diplomatic' channels.' 14
Indeed, submitting to the panel procedure implies accepting the
results of its independent assessment. Once the Council adopts
the panel report, its rulings and recommendations "are thereby
given legal force under Art. XXIII:2 and entail a legal obligation
to withdraw any measure inconsistent with GATT."'15 In other
words, by avoiding the panel procedure, governments were
showing a distressing tendency to adopt pragmatic, "power-ori-
ented" solutions to trade conflicts, rather than putting their
trust in available "rule-oriented" procedures (to use John Jack-
son's well-known formulation).16
In an attempt to remedy this situation, one of the results of
the Tokyo Round negotiations was an "Understanding Regard-
ing Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveil-
lance,17" which expanded on GATT Articles XXII and XXIII.
The "Understanding" created a "roster" of GATT experts (both
governmental and non-governmental) from which parties to a
dispute could choose to serve on panels of conciliation. The "Un-
derstanding" clarified the role of these panels, in particular re-
garding the establishment of the facts of the case (in the case of
"violation" disputes) or the "nullification or impairment" of
benefits (in the case of "non-violation" disputes). It also empha-
sized that contracting parties should not view requests for a
panel "as contentious acts" and that all contracting parties "will
engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve
the disputes."'18
13. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES
9 (Trade Policy Research Centre, 1978) (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 11.
15. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT Dispute Settlement System and
the Uruguay Negotiations on Its Reform, in LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 53, 64 (Petar Sarcevic & Hans van Houtte eds., 1990).
16. See John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade
System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 98 (1978); John H. Jackson, Governmental
Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the Context of GATT,
13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 3 (1979).
17. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settle-
ment and Surveillance, BISD 26th Supp. 210 (1980) (adopted Nov. 28, 1979)
[hereinafter 1979 Understanding].
18. Id. at 211-12.
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The GATT jargon distinguishing between "violation" and
"non-violation" disputes hides a very interesting feature of the
GATT system. That is, the system allows the panel procedure to
apply to disputes arising from measures which do not formally
violate GATT, but which do injure the trading interests of one's
partners. This provision, although seldom used,19 should be-
come more and more important in the future as the increasing
interdependence of national economies causes virtually every
"domestic" economic policy of any significance to generate ex-
ternal side-effects on one's neighbors. The reluctance of coun-
tries to initiate such proceedings is understandable because the
resulting panel finding might well invade the jealously pre-
served domain of "domestic policy."
Whether as a result of the 1979 "Understanding," or because
of a shift toward rule-oriented solutions to disputes, it is note-
worthy that the 1980s saw a significant increase in the number of
disputes culminating in a panel procedure.20 The GATT Council
even congratulated itself on the fact that "a common under-
standing on the importance of the GATT law in international
trade was reflected in the increasingly frequent use of its dispute
settlement procedures."' 21 It is an unfortunate fact, however,
that "gray area" measures continued to flourish during the
1980s. In particular, they flourished in the form of misuse of
anti-dumping measures and continued reliance on "voluntary"
export restraints. Is GATT therefore, like Alice, running faster
and faster in order to stay in the same place?
In fact, the real weakness of the GATT dispute-settlement
system as "judge" and "bailiff" is simply that unless a party
complains, measures inconsistent with GATT go unchallenged.
There is no "Director of Public Prosecutions" and because peo-
ple in glass houses don't throw stones, the GATT system risks
decay from neglect. This is why the increase in the use of the
formal dispute settlement procedure is a welcome sign, but is by
no means enough to ensure general compliance with the rules.
Because of this problem, the Uruguay Round negotiations
have returned to the issue, sensing that there is little point in
improving world trade law and developing new "disciplines" in
areas such as services, intellectual property rights or direct in-
19. Petersmann, supra note 15, at 65. "Non-violation complaints" account
for less than five percent of all cases. Id
20. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES 1989,
at 76-77 (1990) [hereinafter GATT ACTIVITIES 1989]; JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING
THE GATT, at 66.
21. GATT ACTIVITIES 1989, supra note 20, at 31.
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vestment unless respect for international law can at the same
time be enhanced.
Some progress has been made in this delicate area. At the
mid-term Review in Montreal in 1988, it was agreed to imple-
ment, on a trial basis, the following improvements, inter alia:22
a) an increased mediation role for the GATT's Director-General;23
b) recourse to binding arbitration if the parties concerned agreed
ahead of time; 2
4
c) the use of standard terms of reference for all panels;25
d) the right for any country to raise the question of non-compliance
with a panel report.
26
The current draft of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round27 con-
tains two texts relating to dispute settlement: a detailed formal
"Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes Under Articles XXII and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; '28 and a text entitled "Ele-
ments of an Integrated Dispute Settlement System"29 which
would come into operation if the proposed Multilateral Trade
Organization is created.
The "General Provisions" of the Draft Understanding pro-
vide a sharpening of the attitude of contracting parties with re-
gard to the end-game being played. The parties reaffirm, for
instance, that a mutually agreed solution consistent with GATT
"is clearly to be preferred," 30 that withdrawal of the contested
measure is more desirable than compensation,31 and that retalia-
tion is a last resort.32 The Draft Understanding restates that
"requests for conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement
22. Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
BISD 36th Supp. 61-67 (1990) (adopted Apr. 12, 1989) [hereinafter 1989
Improvements].
23. Id. D(3), at 62.
24. Id E(3), at 63.
25. This will help to speed up the process of establishing panels. Id.
F(b)(1), at 63-64.
26. Id. 11(3), at 67.
27. Drqft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. 1MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) (avail-
able from the Office of the United States Trade Representative) [hereinafter
Dunel DrAft].
28. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes Under Articles XXII and XXIII, in Dunkel Draft, supra note 27, at S.1
[hereinafter Draft Understanding].
29. Elements of an Integrated Dispute Settlement System, in Dunkel Draft,
supra note 27, at T.1 [hereinafter Elements].
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procedures... should not be intended or considered as conten-
tious acts. '33
After the General Provisions, there follow detailed proce-
dures concerning various stages of the dispute settlement sys-
tem. A tight timetable for consultations is established so that if
the search for a mutually agreed solution is unsuccessful, the
panel procedure can be initiated without delay.34 Although
there is no automatic right to a panel, the complaining party's
request for a panel can only be refused by "consensus" (i.e., no
negative vote).s3 This virtually amounts to an automatic right to
a panel, a point of considerable importance in encouraging their
use.
The Draft Understanding goes beyond the Montreal deci-
sion in three important respects:
a) it creates a "Standing Appellate Body" to hear appeals from panel
cases;
36
b) it mandates parties to resort to binding arbitration if a dispute
degenerates to the point of disagreement over the extent of retalia-
tory measures;
37
c) it renews a commitment not to resort to unilateral measures (or
threat thereof) as an alternative to the dispute-settlement
procedure.3s
This set of measures constitutes a substantial strengthening
of rule-based procedures in GATT. In "violation" disputes, the
panels already conduct, in effect, a judicial review of the case. If
the Draft Understanding is adopted, the losing party would have
the right to appeal the decision in a "second court." This would
be limited to reviewing the issues of law covered in the panel
report and upholding, modifying or reversing them. The appel-
late report would then be adopted by the Council and "uncondi-
tionally accepted by the parties to the dispute" unless the
Council decided "by consensus" not to adopt the report.3 9 If
33. This statement was also part of the 1979 Understanding, supra note 17,
at 211.
34. Generally, the Council will act to establish a panel at the second meet-
ing at which the complainant's request appears on the agenda. 1989 Improve-
menta, supra note 22, F(a), at 63. Because the Council meets approximately
once a month, establishment of a panel usually takes place less than two
months after the parties determine that consultation has failed.
35. Draft Understanding, supra note 28, 1 4.1.
36. Id. 15-17.
37. Id. T 20.3.
38. Id. 1 21. This last item is clearly aimed at section 301 of the U.S. Trade
Act of 1974, which, as amended, positions the United States to use unilateral
trade sanctions as a means to resolve disputes. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
39. Draft Understanding, supra note 28, 15.14.
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adopted, this procedure would definitely reinforce the standing
of the second finding, because the dispute would have gone
through a detailed, two-stage judicial process. It would be very
difficult for any contracting party to disregard the final outcome.
Symmetrical to the virtual "right" to a panel noted above, it
is almost impossible for the losing party to block (as at present)
the Council's decision to adopt a panel report, because it is
"adopted at a Council meeting... unless the Council decides by
consensus not to adopt the report."' 4 This is a noteworthy im-
provement on current practice.
The "Elements of an Integrated Dispute Settlement Sys-
tem" are much more controversial. They provide for a single
dispute settlement system for the entire multilateral trade sys-
tem as it emerges from the Uruguay Round. As discussed below,
a Multilateral Trade Organization is proposed as a general
framework for running the hugely expanded scope of world
commercial law - including the texts on services, intellectual
property rights and trade-related investment measures.
The "Elements" contain a hierarchy of possible retaliatory
measures in a section entitled "Integrated Dispute Settlement
System," and specify that countries should give preference first
to the "suspension of concessions" within the "same sector,"'41
then to "other sectors under the same agreement,"42 and finally
to "other obligations under another agreement. '43
Thus cross-retaliation (for example, a trade concession
withdrawn in a dispute involving services) is possible, but in
principle discouraged. This question is a bone of contention be-
tween developed and developing countries and may yet come up
for re-negotiation.
The Draft Understanding provides for greater predictability
and automaticity in the dispute settlement process, as well as
stricter discipline on unilateral actions and more sustained col-
lective surveillance than the existing system. It does much more
than codify existing practice, and breaks important new ground.
If implemented, it stands a good chance of revolutionizing the
way disputes are handled in GATT. By making the whole pro-
cess legitimate and transparent, it may even bring some "gray
area" measures into its net.
40. Id. 14.4.
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II. THE TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM
The absence of a "Director of Public Prosecutions" means
that unless a complaint is made, actions inconsistent with GATT
can and do flourish. One can see how small countries might, if
they wished, "get away with [protectionist] murder," because the
offending measures affect a relatively small trading volume.
Large countries, in contrast, might tailor protectionist measures
to affect trading partners just below the threshold of pain that
would trigger a complaint. As mentioned earlier, there is also a
reluctance to launch a complaint if one is oneself vulnerable.44
Although the 1979 Understanding emphasizes that "complaints
and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not
be linked, '45 some hesitation is only natural. For instance,
although Japan is a frequent victim of discriminatory trade re-
strictions (in particular, "voluntary" export restraints and dubi-
ous antidumping actions),46 it never invoked the GATT dispute
settlement provisions (until in October 1988, Japan was finally
provoked to action by the European Community's "screwdriver"
regulation). 47 But might part of the reason for Japan's infre-
quent use of the GATT dispute-settlement system be a reluc-
tance to expose itself to retaliatory complaints from others? In
any event, improving the dispute settlement process, though
useful, is unlikely to capture more than a small fraction of the
sum of all GATT violations.
For this reason, the adoption in 1989 of a Trade Policy Re-
view Mechanism (TPRM) is a welcome development." This
mechanism creates, for the first time, a standing general moni-
toring device which scrutinizes each contracting party's trade
policies as a whole: "[T]he review mechanism will enable the
regular collective appreciation and evaluation by the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES of the full range of individual con-
44. See supra text accompanying note 19.
45. 1979 Understanding, supra note 17, at 212.
46. Gerard and Victoria Curzon, Follies in European Trade Relations with
Japan, 10:2 WORLD ECON. 155, 170-73 (1987).
47. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES 1988
68-70 (1989) [hereinafter GATT ACTIVITIES 1988]. Even the GATT Secretariat,
in drawing up its annual report, was moved to remark that this was the first
Japanese complaint since it joined in 1955.
48. For a general discussion of review mechanisms, see Richard
Blackhurst, Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies, in
THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND




tracting parties' trade policies and practices... .-49 This should
pick up the dubious trade measures which do not give rise to
formal complaints.
One can trace the idea of increased surveillance of trade pol-
icies in GATT back to the Tokyo Round. In 1979, the "Under-
standing Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance" provided, inter alia, for special
GATT Council meetings to review general developments in the
trading system.50 The GATT Secretariat prepared a document
for these meetings, based on a combination of official trade pol-
icy notifications and on what it was able to glean from the press
and unofficial sources. These documents were (after initial hesi-
tation) made available to the general public once the GATT
Council had discussed them. The academic community greatly
appreciated the documents; but, because they were purely fac-
tual and descriptive, they never hit the headlines. They also did
not meet the need for a comprehensive and authoritative review
of all members' trade policies.
In 1983, the Director-General of GATT invited seven emi-
nent persons to study and report on problems facing the interna-
tional trading system. In 1985, in their report entitled Trade
Policies for a Better Future: Proposals for Action,51 the eighth
of their fifteen concrete proposals read as follows:
At the international level, trade policy and the functioning of the trad-
ing system should be made more open. Countries should be subject to
regular oversight or surveillance of their policies and actions, about
which the GAT Secretariat should collect and publish information.52
The Eminent Persons Group suggested that "Governments
should be required regularly to explain and defend their overall
trade policies." 53 This would "increase the accountability of gov-
ernments for their trade practices." 54 The GATT Secretariat
"should be empowered to initiate studies of national trade poli-
cies .... By thus acting as watchdog (though not judge) on be-
half of the trading system as a whole, the Secretariat would help
to prevent departures from the rules and to strengthen the abil-
ity of all countries - and especially the smaller and developing
49. Functioning of the GATT System, BISD 36th Supp. 403, 403 (1990)
(TPRM adopted Apr. 12, 1989).
50. 1979 Understanding, supra note 17, 24, at 214.
51. EMINENT PERSONS GROUP, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION (Mar.
1985).
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 42.
54. Id.
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countries - to defend their trade interests."
When the Uruguay Round was launched in September 1986,
among the fifteen broad issues to be addressed was a commit-
ment to the following:
Negotiations shall aim to develop understandings and arrangements...
to enhance the surveillance in the GA' to enable regular monitoring
of trade policies and practices of contracting parties and their impact
on the functioning of the multilateral trading system.
56
In January 1987, a Surveillance Body was established in order to
monitor the standstill and rollback provisions of the 1986 Minis-
terial Declaration.5 7 But the real breakthrough came at the
mid-term Montreal ministerial meeting in December 1988, when
it was decided to set up, on a provisional basis, a Trade Policy
Review Mechanism.6 0
III. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE TPRM
The TPRM differs from the previous semiannual Special
Council meetings 9 which it has superseded, in that trade policy
developments are now examined on a country-by-country ba-
sis.60 In order to ensure generality, all GATT contracting par-
ties are evaluated regularly on a rotating basis, but the largest
trading countries come up for review more frequently than their
smaller counterparts.61 In short, sovereign nations, large and
small, have agreed to submit to a periodic peer check-up on their
protectionist misdeeds.
55. Id.
56. Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, GATT Focus, Oct. 1986, at 1-6
(adopted Sept. 20, 1986), reprinted in 25 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1623 (1986).
57. "Standstill" and "rollback" were two political undertakings made by
Ministers in Punta del Este designed to prevent the further deterioration of the
trading system while the talks progressed. In the case of standstill, the under-
taking involved:
(i) no new trade restrictions inconsistent with GATT;
(ii) no new trade restrictions which go further than necessary to rem-
edy specific situations provided for in GATT; and
(iii) no trade measures taken to improve negotiating positions.
GATT ACTrvmIEs 1988, supra note 47, at 25.
Rollback was seen as "a limited means of trade policy disarmament - in
other words, the progressive dismantling, during the Round, of all trade restric-
tions which are inconsistent with GATT." Id.
58. The formal decision was reached in April 1989. Functioning of the
GATT System, supra note 49, at 403.
59. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
60. Functioning of the GATT System, supra note 49, I(A)(i), at 403.
61. Id. I(C)(i). The determining factor is a country's "impact on the func-
tioning of the multilateral trading system, defined in terms of share of world
trade in a recent representative period.. ." Id.
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The TPRM separates countries into three review cycles.
The four largest trading entities (the United States, the Euro-
pean Community, Japan and Canada) will be reviewed every
two years; the next sixteen, every four years; the rest every six
years.62 Given that GATT has 104 members, this program im-
plies about 20 country reviews per year.
Each review involves two reports, one supplied by the coun-
try under scrutiny and one drawn up by the GATT Secretariat
"on its own responsibility, based on the information available to
it and that provided by the contracting party."' 6 In order that
the Review Mechanism does not function at cross-purposes with
the traditional notification obligations contained in the General
Agreement, it is specified that information contained in country
reports "should to the greatest extent possible be coordinated
with notifications made under GATT provisions."' ' This rather
curious provision reflects the concerns that the obligation under
GATT Article X to publish "laws, regulations, judicial decisions
and administrative rulings" relating to trade and the agreement
to register with the GATT Secretariat copies of such laws, regu-
lations, etc., are in fact not taken seriously.65 The provision also
reflects the hope that the secretariat's TPRM report will not
only fill the gap but shame countries into providing a better ac-
count of their trade r6gimes.6
Each report is prepared according to a common template,
which may change in the light of experience.6 7 The GATT Sec-
retariat estimates that it devotes about ten man/months to each
report. Much of the research is done in Geneva; nevertheless,
before the final report is drafted, a team of two or three people
spend a week or two in the capital of the country concerned to
fill out the details and check the facts. Unlike the old-style bian-
nual review of general trade policy developments by the Secreta-
riat, each country review contains a final chapter entitled
"Summary Observations," in which the GATT Secretariat
presents its own (very diplomatic) assessment of the situation.
The key to the whole process lies in the review itself, which
is carried out by the GATT Council at a special meeting, al-
lowing one day per country. The review starts with a presenta-
62. Id.
63. Id. I(D)(iv)(b).64. Id I(B)(i).
65. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT supra note 3,
at 461-64.
66. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
67. Functioning of the GATT System, supra note 49, I(B)(i).
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tion by the representative of the country concerned; this is
followed by two discussants (appointed by the Chairman), whose
role is to be frank and critical and to ask awkward questions; the
discussion is then opened up and any interested party can make
critical (or complimentary) observations and raise questions. Fi-
nally, the country under review is given a chance to reply. The
final published report, unlike most other official GATT publica-
tions, identifies the countries making the commentaries.
As soon as possible after this procedure, both reports and a
summary of the discussions are published. The review process
does not stop there, however, because the periodic cycle of con-
sultation ensures that all major traders are regularly re-ex-
amined. The Review Mechanism thus allows GATT to take an
inventory of trade measures already in place and, in the future,
will provide a measure of the flow of new, post review policy
actions.68
As of March 1992, twenty-three reports had been published
and a dozen more were on the way.69 It will be interesting to see
how the GATT Council and Secretariat handle the subsequent
reviews of the "majors" (the United States, the European Com-
munity and Japan). As they are to be reviewed at very short
intervals, it may turn out that relatively few resources will have
to be devoted to tracking new developments, allowing more ef-
fort to be directed towards evaluating the impact of existing poli-
cies on domestic economic welfare and on the distribution of
income. Nevertheless, when (not to say if) the Uruguay Round
is brought to a successful conclusion, the TPRM will be ex-
tended to monitor the policies arising from the new aspects of
GATT, the General Agreement on Services and other Uruguay
Round agreements. This will again increase the resources
needed for the subsequent reviews.
While the improvement in the dispute-settlement procedure
described in Section I above reflects a rule-based approach to the
68. See Blackhurst, supra note 48, at 127 for the distinction between sur-
veillance to monitor the flow of new policies, and surveillance to collect infor-
mation on the stock of trade policy measures already in place.
69. In 1990, the Council reviewed the policies of the following countries:
Australia, Canada, Colombia, Hong Kong, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Swe-
den, the United States, the European Community, Hungary, and Indonesia; in
1991: Argentina, Norway, Austria, Chile, Singapore, Finland, Nigeria, Ghana,
the United States (for the second time), Thailand, and Switzerland; scheduled
for 1992: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada (for the second time), the Euro-
pean Community (for the second time), Japan (for the second time), Kenya,
Korea, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa and Uruguay.
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problem of the "judge and bailiff," the TPRM reflects a diplo-
matic and peer-pressure approach to the enforcement problem.
The evaluation of trade and trade-related policies is not
made according to the criterion of conformity or non-conformity
with GATT, but according to the more ambiguous criterion of
the impact of a contracting party's trade policies and practices on
the multilateral trading system.70 Indeed, it is at this price that
one supposes that contracting parties agreed to the procedure in
the first place. One can see, however, that a continually updated
and comprehensive inventory of dubious trade policy measures
would reduce the information costs of monitoring compliance
with GATT. At present, no one really knows the extent of the
"gray-area" problem, precisely because it is a gray area and
hence unrecorded.
It terms of the free-rider problem discussed in the introduc-
tion, the TPRM should improve the incentives for compliance
and increase the likelihood of outcome number 2 (co-operation)
because it will be harder to cheat without others noticing.
Not everyone is in agreement with this analysis, however.
According to John Jackson, a leading authority:
Mhese reviews are not likely to have a significant impact on the im-
plementation or effectiveness of the legal obligations contained in the
variety of GATT treaties and protocols, including those that will come
into effect at the end of the Uruguay Round. Indeed there are some
risks that this review mechanism will divert attention from the legal
norms in such a way as to actually decrease the pressure on Con-
tracting Parties to observe those norms.7 1
The question really boils down to an assessment of whether the
peer pressure and increased transparency generated by the
TPRM will have more than a marginal effect on the trade sys-
tem, and whether the TPRM is complementary to, rather than
in competition with, the dispute-settlement regime. Time will
tell.
IV. GREATER DOMESTIC TRANSPARENCY
It is now well established that the ultimate source of persis-
tent and harmful protectionist policies in otherwise democratic
countries lies in the strength of producer interests compared
with the relative weakness of consumer interests in the domestic
formulation of international trade policy. 72 It follows that a last-
70. Functioning of the GA7T System, supra note 49, 1 I(A)(i), at 403.
71. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT supra note 7, at 80.
72. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: Eco-
NOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).
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ing improvement in the multilateral trading system can occur
only if consumers (or down-stream user industries) can be better
integrated into the trade policy formation process "at home."
This was suggested in 1985 by the Eminent Persons Group,
one of whose concrete proposals read:
In each country, the making of trade policy should be brought into the
open. The costs and benefits of trade policy actions, existing and pro-
spective, should be analyzed through a "protection balance sheet." Pri-
vate and public companies should be required to reveal in their
financial statements the amount of any subsidies received. Public sup-
port for open trade policies should be fostered.
7 3
Noting that most governments come to trade policy decisions be-
hind closed doors, the group emphasized the danger that "a
trade ministry will be too easily persuaded in private discussions
to support a client domestic industry, without considering the
interests of downstream users, the final consumer, or the econ-
omy as a whole."74 They went on to observe that an "essential
first step in developing support for better trade policies is public
awareness."
75
In the course of the Uruguay Round, Australia, Canada,
Hong Kong and New Zealand submitted a joint paper on domes-
tic transparency, proposing that "GATT members should en-
courage and promote national awareness of the government
policy-making process related to trade."76 These talks are still
continuing.
In a similar vein, Switzerland has presented a proposal on
the domestic implementation of trade rules via a general under-
taking by countries to apply GATT obligations directly under
national laws.77 If ever adopted, this would allow private indi-
viduals to invoke the right to freer and non-discriminatory trade
in domestic courts and even to sue their own governments in
case of protectionist measures which reduce their wealth or in-
come. At present, only governments may invoke GATT rules in
disputes with other governments, and the above discussion has
shown how rudimentary the process is as compared with a full-
fledged judicial system. However, at this stage in the develop-
ment of the global trade system, governments are most unlikely
to bind their hands in this way. One day this last, logical step in
73. EMINENT PERSONS GROUP, supra note 51, at 35.
74. Id at 36.
75. Id
76. GATT AcTVITiEs 1989, supra note 20, at 71.
77. Id. at 69.
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establishing a "self-enforcing liberal trade constitution '78 will
perhaps be taken.
All that is left of this idea in the December 1991 "Dunkel
Draft ' 79 is a short paragraph in the proposed decision on "The
Functioning of the GATT System," wherein "Ministers recog-
nize the inherent value of domestic transparency of government
decision-making on trade policy matters ... and agree to en-
courage and promote greater transparency within their national
systems." 0
A combination of an enhanced dispute settlement system,
increased transparency at the international level thanks to the
TPRM and institutions for increasing transparency at the na-
tional level (if widely introduced) would already, in this author's
view, considerably strengthen the multilateral trading system,
without actually introducing a single new obligation.
V. ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE
During the Uruguay Round, a Surveillance Body was set up
to monitor the "standstill" and "rollback" commitments made at
the start of the Round."' Although this body will not survive the
Round itself, the way it has operated gives an indication of how
the TPRM and the dispute settlement system might interact.
Since the start of the Uruguay Round, the Surveillance Body has
received twenty-six notifications of new restrictions inconsistent
with GATT (including the notorious beef hormone cases2)
where the notifying country "expresses concern about" impend-
ing or threatened trade measures.8 3 It is obvious that in the
event of the failure of the Uruguay Round, precisely designed to
address many of the problems reported to the Surveillance
Body, some of these simmering disputes will become open
conflicts.
But it may be useful to have a "slow fuse" in trade disputes,
allowing plenty of time to find compromises. This is a variant of
the "bicycle theory," which holds that the GATT system is in-
78. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Improvements to the Functioning of the
GATT System (Including Dispute Settlement), Paper presented to a conference
on "A New GATT for the Nineties and Europe '92," Tiibingen (July 1990), at 20.
79. Dunkel Drqft, supra note 27.
80. Id. at Y.1.
81. See supra note 57 (describing standstill and rollback provisions).
82. GATT ACTrvEs 1989, supra note 20, at 42.
83. GATT AcirrIEs 1988, supra note 47, at 25-26; GATT ACTIVITIES 1989,
supra note 20, at 39-42; GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GAT
AcTrvriEs 1990 33-34 (1991).
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herently unstable and either moves forward or collapses. As
long as one keeps talking, governments can hold protectionist
lobbies at bay. Aho and Aronson put it this way: "[U]nless for-
ward momentum is maintained, the trading system, like the bi-
cyclist, will tumble over .... 84
It shall be seen what, if anything, happens to the "stand-
still" notifications after the end of the Uruguay Round. But ex-
perience suggests that while the periodic, non-aggressive TPRM
might be a useful multilateral forum in which countries could
"express concern about" issues to particular partners, there is
merit in conducting a general review of developments in the in-
ternational trading environment as well. This is, of course, not
new, but it is proposed that contracting parties should codify ex-
isting practice. "Ministers regard these annual overviews by the
GATT Council as an important element in enhanced surveil-
lance in the GATT, and recommend that they continue as under
the present arrangements."85
In sum, the system reviews some twenty countries annually
on an individual basis, and conducts a general overview as well.
It is inconceivable that major problems, even of a strictly bilat-
eral nature, should fail to escape multilateral attention, includ-
ing interested public opinion.
In addition, a proposal has been made to tighten up the gen-
eral obligation to notify all trade measures and to establish a
central registry of notifications under the responsibility of the
GATT Secretariat. Each notification is to include information
"as [to] its purpose, its trade coverage, and the requirement
under which it has been notified."8 Every year, the "central
registry shall draw the attention of individual contracting par-
ties to regular notification requirements which remain
unfulfilled. '8 7
Since the notifications are to be made "without prejudice to
views on the consistency of measures with or their relevance to
rights and obligations under the General Agreement," 8 it seems
that "gray area" measures which have bedevilled the GATT for
years will at last be recorded. Again, these apparently innocu-
ous administrative provisions strike this author as being impor-
84. C. MICHAEL AHO & JONATHAN D. ARONDON, TRADE TALKS. AMERICA
BETTER LISTEN! 6 (1955).
85. Dunkel Draft, supra note 27, at Y.1.
86. Id. at Y.2.
87. Id. at Y.3.
88. Id. at Y.2 (I. General Obligation to Notify).
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tant developments in improving the transparency of the trade
system, thereby reducing the incentive to cheat. The "transac-
tions costs" of monitoring the trade system will fall, reducing
the incidence of free-riding.8 9 Furthermore, if all trade meas-
ures are centrally recorded it will become much easier for in-
dependent researchers to evaluate their implications for welfare
and income distribution, thereby encouraging a more balanced
domestic trade policy debate (see section IV above).
VI. A MULTILATERAL TRADE ORGANIZATION
Finally, the contracting parties may at last decide to turn
the GATT into a formal international trade organization. John
Jackson, from academia, is a noted proponent of this idea.90 The
arguments in favor are basically that the GATT "system" is be-
coming unmanageably complex. Besides the GATT itself, there
are the Tokyo Round codes and agreements, as well as the Mul-
tifibre Arrangement, each of them with its own set of members,
dispute-settlement provisions and supervisory institutions. One
reason for this proliferation is doubtless a certain tradition of
pragmatism within GATT's diplomatic circles. It was so much
easier to reach agreement among a small group of like-minded
countries than to try to obtain the consent of two-thirds of
GATT's contracting parties. However, the consequence of
stand-alone agreements on matters closely linked to GATT is
that they bind only the signatories, and not all side-agreements
attract the same members. This principle of giomdtrie variable
is invading the basic structure of rights and obligations. Law-
yers have pointed to the danger of conflict of laws, the potential
incoherence of mutual rights and obligations, the threat to the
basic MFN obligation and unprincipled "forum shopping" when
disputes arise.
For this reason, the Uruguay Round negotiators have
drafted an ambitious "Agreement Establishing the Multilateral
Trade Organization."9 1 This is a new development since the fail-
ure of the first draft global package of the results of the Uruguay
Round, presented in Brussels in December 1990.92 At the time it
was feared that countries participating in the negotiations might
content themselves with form rather than substance, by agree-
89. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
90. See JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 91-103.
91. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Annex
IV to Dunkel Draft, supra note 27, at 91-101 [hereinafter, MTO Agreement].
92. GAIT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/35 (Nov. 26, 1990).
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ing to set up a Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) while
failing to come to a substantive agreement on all the difficult
issues under discussion during the Uruguay Round. It is still un-
clear at the time of this writing whether this fear is well
grounded or not, but one may venture to suggest that unless the
substantive parts of the Uruguay Round are agreed to, the MTO
will be purely symbolic.
Two institutional matters had already been agreed upon in
principle in the December 1990 draft agreement: the need to
raise the political visibility of GATT by organizing a meeting of
Ministers of Trade of all contracting parties at least once every
two years; and the need to improve institutional relationships
with other international organizations, in particular the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and World Bank.93 Both matters find
their natural place in the proposed new MTO. Both the Inte-
grated Dispute Settlement Understanding and the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism also find their respective anchors there.
However, it is worth noting that the MTO, unlike the Havana
Charter, is not designed to be part of the United Nations system.
The MTO anticipates various supporting institutions. The
GATT Council will be replaced by a General Council, open (as at
present) "to representatives of all the members, which shall
meet regularly, as appropriate."94 In addition, there will be
three subsidiary Councils - a Council for Goods, a Council for
Services and a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) - and two important "bodies" - the
Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism.95
In order to prevent "forum shopping" in the event of dis-
putes arising from side agreements with limited membership
(such as the Tokyo Round agreement on Government Procure-
ment or on Civil Aircraft), it is mentioned specifically that the
new "Integrated Dispute Settlement System" will apply to these
agreements. The new system only applies to the extent that the
signatories which are parties to the dispute are also members of
the MTO.96
More significantly, however, the MTO is designed to admin-
93. Droft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/35 (Nov. 1990).
94. MTO Agreement, supra note 91, at 93 (Article V.2).
95. Id. at 93-94.
96. Id. at 92. It is most likely that the members of these side agreements
will also belong to the new MTO. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
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ister not only the GATT as it emerges from the Uruguay Round,
but also "all Agreements and Arrangements concluded under its
auspices and the complete results of the Uruguay Round multi-
lateral trade negotiations."9 Thus it is designed to apply also to
the General Agreement on Services, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Trade-Related
Aspects of Investment Measures, and all the agreements to date
on the interpretation of the General Agreement itself (i.e., both
the Tokyo and Uruguay Round agreements). Indeed, the Agree-
ment establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization is in-
tended to supersede the existing GATT instruments, and will
apply to "GATT as modified." Article 11.3 states categorically
"The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as it results
from the Final Act of the Uruguay Round... is legally distinct
from the Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947."98
In 1986, conscious of the dangers of traditional GATT prag-
matism, contracting parties agreed that the results of the Uru-
guay Round should "be treated as parts of a single
undertaking,"99 in the sense that participants agreed in advance
not to pick and choose, but to accept all or nothing. The signato-
ries to the Uruguay Round, be they many or few, would all be
subject to the same rules and disciplines (notwithstanding spe-
cial provisions for developing countries). In these circum-
stances, an over-arching framework was not strictly necessary
and indeed was not suggested until very late in the day.
Problems might (and may still) arise, however, between those
contracting parties to GATT which do not sign the Final Act of
the Uruguay Round and those that do. Perhaps the MTO is in-
tended to be seen as a clear new departure, a symbolic break
with the past and a way of encouraging a maximum number of
countries, including developing countries, to sign up for the new
system. The principal change, legally speaking, is that the old
GATT will lapse, and with it the Protocol of Provisional Appli-
cation. 1°° The new GATT "as it results from the Final Act of the
97. MTO Agreement, supra note 91, preamble at 91.
98. MTO Agreement, supra note 91, at Art. 11.3.
99. Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, supra note 50.
100. It is one of GATT's many idiosyncracies (another aspect of diplomatic
pragmatism) that its members (with the exception of Haiti) only apply it "provi-
sionally" "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with the existing legislation."
This quirk dates back to 1947, when speed of accession and maximum member-
ship were high on the agenda, and allowed contracting parties all the time they
needed to bring their domestic legislation in line with GATT. By now, the Pro-
tocol of Provisional Application and the subsequent Protocols of Accession have
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Uruguay Round" will be a very different institution, providing it
achieves the universality of membership and scope for which it
is aiming.
CONCLUSION
Rules and the institutions that develop around them do
matter. They shape human behavior and produce different out-
comes, depending on their structures. One only has to look at
how differently firms behave, depending on whether they are in
a competitive or protected environment; or how central banks
behave, depending on whether or not they are independent of
politicians; or how the police behave, depending on whether or
not the judiciary is independent of government.
According to one view,' 0 ' effective rules and institutions de-
velop slowly, over time, as a result of a process of trial and error
and as a result of competition between different rules and insti-
tutions, producing different and more or less desirable out-
comes. The law itself represents the codification, at a given
point in time, of this evolutionary process. "The reason why
such rules will tend to develop is that the groups which happen
to have adopted rules conducive to a more effective order of ac-
tions will tend to prevail over other groups with a less effective
order."102
GATT's slowly evolving institutional development, and pos-
sible future developments, seem to be yet another instance of
such a process. Ranging back into the nineteenth century, as in-
dustrial development took off and prompted a dramatic increase
in world trade, sovereign states have searched for the appropri-
ate institutions to foster peaceful commerce. They have not al-
ways succeeded. Their failures, however, have been as useful as
their triumphs. The breakdown of the world trade system in the
1930s, and its terrible consequences, led directly to the attempt
to shape a new world economic order even as the Second World
War was being waged.
The need for an international economic order arose because
internal actions by individual nations began to generate external
effects on other nations. From that time onward it became nec-
essary for all countries engaged in the process of industrializa-
lost most of their bite - with one major exception: the lack of an injury test in
U.S. law pertaining to countervailing duties.
101. See (of his many works) FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY (1973).
102. Id. at 99.
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tion to agree on the line to be drawn between what is essentially
the "protected domain" of nations and what needs to be gov-
erned by a common set of international rules, thus reducing the
mutual interference of their actions with each other's intentions.
If one considers, simplistically, that there are two types of gov-
ernment action - those that have little or no effect on other
countries and those that have a clear impact - then interna-
tional rules are unnecessary for the former, but are much
needed for the latter. In their absence, lack of information on
how other countries will behave prevails, and different govern-
ments' actions (whose effect is anyway uncertain) will tend to
collide with each other, thus causing conflict.
As far as the international trade order is concerned, given
the increasing globalization of the world economy, most govern-
ment actions are of this latter type, creating an ever increasing
domain for international law and a constantly shrinking sphere
for autonomous government action. Sovereign states find this
process hard to accept, but the payoff is a world economic order
where the actions of individual nations conflict less often with
each other.
In a primitive legal system, such as that governing relations
between sovereign states, one cannot expect that the rules will
always be observed (they are not always observed even in ad-
vanced legal systems benefitting from judges, bailiffs and pris-
ons!). All one can hope for is that such common rules as can be
identified will increase the propensity to act (or not to act) in a
certain manner. "Enforcement" of rules is impossible in a prim-
itive legal system. Respect for rules occurs only on a voluntary
basis and increasing respect for them involves an understanding
on the part of the "individuals" in the system that in the long
run they stand to gain from a general acceptance of the rules.
Frequently, this long-term advantage has to be offset against
short-term gains that can be enjoyed from the gratification of
immediate desires, which are in conflict with the system. Only
accumulated experience can teach actors in the system where
their interests lie, and even then they will opt for short-term
gratification if their time-horizons are short.
Another factor which increases respect for the rules is peer
pressure. Hayek, for one, agrees: "The mere feeling that some
action would be so outrageous that one's fellows would not toler-
ate it is... quite as significant as the enforcement by that regu-
lar procedure which we find in advanced legal systems. 10 3
103. Id. at 96.
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Finally, the role of the judge in a primitive legal system is very
important. To quote Hayek again:
The reason why the judge will be asked to intervene will be that the
rules which secure such a matching of expectations are not always ob-
served, or clear enough, or adequate to prevent conflicts even if ob-
served. Since new situations in which the established rules are not
adequate will constantly arise, the task of preventing conflict and en-
hancing the compatitibility of actions by appropriately delimiting the
range of permitted actions is of necessity a never-ending one, requiring
not only the application of already established rules but also the for-
mulation of new rules necessary for the preservation of the order of
actions.10
4
In short, we are at that stage in the evolution of the primi-
tive law governing international trade where the role of the
judge (GATT panels) and of peer pressure (TPRM) is being
codified. And this in itself is, according to Hayek, not merely a
matter of articulating what had already developed spontane-
ously, because:
The unarticulated rules will.. . usually contain both more and less
than what the verbal formula succeeds in expressing .... The process
of articulation will thus sometimes in effect, though not in intention,
produce new rules ... the result of such efforts may be the creation of
something that has not existed before.
10 5
This is exactly what the transition from the old to the new
GATT represents. The old GATT is more than just a treaty
which has developed an interesting set of rules and institutions
because of the peculiar circumstances of its birth. It is an evolv-
ing body of law which has developed a set of appropriate institu-
tions as it goes along. But the globalization of the world
economy, the growing importance of foreign direct investment,
technology transfers and services, and the growing importance
of developing countries in the global trade system have obliged
governments to contemplate a revolutionary, non-incremental
change in the institutions governing international economic
relations.
It is still not clear at the time of this writing whether the
Uruguay Round will succeed, for it is truly an ambitious project.
If it fails, some of the modest institutional changes described in
this Article will probably survive, and will become just the latest
instance of the gradual evolution of GATT to adapt to circum-
stances as best it can. But if the Uruguay Round succeeds, it will
surely be an impressive monument to statesmanship.
104. Id. at 119.
105. Id. at 78.
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